No End in Sight (2007): B+

Charles Ferguson’s concise, efficient No End in Sight begins inauspiciously, detailing the build-up to the Iraq War with a swift intro marked by somewhat dubious implications and cause-effects arguments. After this initial stumble, however, his documentary proves a thorough, level-headed examination of the Bush administration’s failure to properly prepare for, and execute, the war itself, offering up interviews with the campaign’s architects, military officials, and administration members (current and former) that lay out the various missteps that have so far made lasting success elusive. No End in Sight convincingly contends that an insufficient number of troops was the war’s most disastrous early failing, since it frustrated attempts to provide basic utilities as well as security for both civilians and landmarks such as the national museum, which was pillaged due to our limited forces (and indifference). When coupled with a lack of on-the-ground infrastructure to run and manage the campaign – American officers spent extended time simply scrounging around for desks, paper and working phones – the U.S.’ inadequate troop levels prevented the army from establishing a level of control that might have helped cut off some of the insurgency before it got started. Ferguson’s aesthetically unadventurous doc plays like a social studies lecture, and as such, its just-the-facts approach can be a tad stultifying. Yet as a thorough account of the strategic mistakes made by Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld during the war’s first years, it’s nonetheless riveting.